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COLONIAL ASPECTS OF THE WAR
In a recent speech Mr. Asquith declared that the greatest
mistake that Germany had made in respect to the war was in her
failure to recognize that there was a British Empire. Great
Britain has long been regarded as a small, insignificant island
off the European coast. She has been looked upon as a secondrate European power somewhat in the class with Italy and Spain.
And such she is in fact if considered by herself alone. But the
war has revealed, what the Empire has long since known, that
England is an imperial rather than a European nation, that she
is but the heart of a group of free autonomous states, that her
strength lies not alone in her own people and resources, but in
the loyal support of her children and children's children throughout the seven seas,
But this insular conception of England is not the mistake of
Germany alone. It has been shared by the public in all the
American and European states. It has been taught in our schools
and universities; it has been accepted by the chancelleries of
Europe. Pick up the first geography which comes to hand and
what do you find? Other countries are studied as political units;
the British Empire, on the contrary, is treated as a philosophic
. abstraction. France we know, Germany we kIiow, England we
know; but the Empire, that vast aggregation of outlying territories and dependencies, we know not or but faintly understand
through the association of its parts with some other state or
continent. Canada is a misplaced portion of the British Empire,
closely attached to the northern boundary of the United States.
Australia is a long-lost island in the South Pacific. India is the
distant seat of a great Asiatic civilization. But nowhere in our
histories, geographies, or public documents do we find a British
Empire. It is like the English constitution; it does not exist.
This misconception of the Empire enters into almost all our
ideas of international relations and policies. Turn, for example,
to the vast array of statistics prepared by our Department of
Commerce and Labour. There we shall find comparative tables
of the population, revenue, imports, and exports of all the leading
countries of the world. But the statistics for England are set
230
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off against the figures for other countries. India and the se1fgoverning colonies are treated as independent states. But how
misleading must be the conclusions in respect to the wealth and
resources of the Empire when based upon such misleading data!
Let us glance for a moment at the growth of foreign trade by
way of illustration. To those of the public who are accustomed
to look upon England as an ancient and somewhat decadent
state, it may come as a surprise to learn that during the past five
years her import and export trade has developed more rapidly
than that of any European country. And if the trade of the
whole Empire is taken into consideration, the statistics are even
more surprising, for it will be found that that trade has not only
greatly exceeded in amount the foreign commerce of any other
nation, but has also grown almost twice as rapidly as that of
Germany, the most prosperous of the European states. To
convert the matter into figures: the foreign trade of the Empire
has increased by approximately £625,000,000 since 1908, and at
the close of the last fiscal year reached the stupendous total of
£2,648,537,000. These fignres lend small support to the theory
of a decadent England or of a moribund Empire. It is only too
true that the commerce of England cannot hope to expand in the
future at the same rapid rate as in the past, but the trade of the
Empire of which England is oolyone of the component members,
is destined to surpass even the fabled wealth of Ormuz and of the
distant East.
A hasty examination of the relative strength of the British
army and navy will afford us an even more interesting basis of
comparison. We in the United States are accustomed to point
to our small but efficient military force as the most convincing
proof of the peaceful character of our foreign policy. And such
in fact it is. The 250,000 men of the British standing army look
like a formidable force for the tight little island; but if that army
is considered, as it ought to be considered, as an imperial force
for the defence of the vast possessions of the British Crown, it
appears in its true light as little more than a large police force.
It is in fact not any larger proportionately than the army of the
United States and insignificant in comparison with the mighty
hosts of Europe. The British navy affords us an even better
illustration of our provincial misconceptions. The huge preponderance of that navy has long been regarded as a danger to all
other states. Its size seems to be altogether out of comparison
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with the economic and political needs of the country. And yet
if it is distinctly understood that that navy is an imperial navy,
the connecting link or arterial system of the whole British Empire,
it will be seen that it is not so formidable as might at first appear.
It is, in reality, relatively smaller than the American, French,
or German navies. If the British navy, for example, were placed
on the same population basis as the German navy, the ratio of
strength between the two fleets would not be the present standard of ten to six, but of approximately four to one. In view of
these facts it is somewhat difficult to believe that the British
Government has set the pace in the senseless race of naval and
military armaments.
It is time that the public enlarged its outlook and commenced
to think imperially. There is, in fact, a British Empire, a huge,
unwieldy agglomeration of territory and people monopolizing
about one-fifth of the earth's surface and commanding the
allegiance of about one-fourth of its inhabitants. It is the
greatest hotchpotch under the sun, a nondescript collection of
English, Irish, Scotch, Indians, Canadians, Australians, Fiji,
Malays, Zulus, and Fuzzy W uzzies of all ranks and conditions of
men, of all races and religious creeds, of all gradations of barbarism and civilization. The British Empire is running a certain
American manufacturer a close race for the lead in the variety
of the products it can turn out and every race as every product
with a distinctive flavour of its own. Yet here it is, a vaster Empire than has been, territorially the most sporadic, socially the
most irreconcilable, constitutionally the weakest, yet politically
one of the strongest of modern governments. The Empire is in
truth the greatest contribution that England has made to the
science and art of government.
But great as has been the misconception as to the existence of
the Empire, still greater has been the mistake in regard to its real
character. It has been represented as a colossal sham, as an
Oriental despotism, living upon the spoils of its subject races.
Day after day we have been assured by a portion of the press
that on the first defeat the Empire would fall asunder, that the
colonies would rise and throw off the yoke of their oppressors.
The dispatch of the colonial troops to the front has been interpreted as an evidence of English weakness and tyranny; it has
been condemned as a betrayal of the civilization of Europe. But
how different have been the results from those anticipated by the
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outside world. Prior to the outbreak of war the Empire was
indeed in deep commotion from Ulster to India; but on the
declaration of war political discontents were largely stilled,
economic and racial differences were almost forgotten. In the
face of foreign danger all the colonies and dependencies have
promptly rallied to the support of the mother land. At once the
war became more than a racial issue between the Slavs and the
Teutons, more than a continental struggle between allied states,
more than an international issue over the neutrality of Belgium
and the moral obligation of treaties; it became, in fact, a great
imperial conflict in which the very principles of colonial government were at stake.
But the question arises how can we account for this anomalous
Empire, this apparent anachronism in an age of intense nationalism. To a large extent it is the product of English political
traditions. The British constitution has been built up on the
twofold principle of personal and political liberty. The Englishman is essentially an individualist. The long course of English
history is a record of his struggles against arbitrary government.
He has worked out his own salvation by his own efforts. He has
developed his own civilization, and in so doing has gained that
strength and self-sufficiency which the possession of immemorial
rights alone can afford. He does not look to the government
for the protection of his liberty; he looks after that for himself.
The very isolation of England has made this characteristic more
pronounced. To this exaggerated individualism is largely due
the general unpopularity of Englishmen. We have all suffered
at some time or other from a certain condescension on the part
of nameless foreigners. As Thackeray has wittily observed, the
Englishman is the most objectionable of all travellers because he
. will insist upon treating the inhabitants of the country in which
he is as though they were foreigners. The Englishman usually
succeeds in giving to his national pretensions a certain personal
~. character. And this it is that chiefly grates On our sensibilities.
I Wecan readily overlook a claim to national superiority, but we
are scarcely prepared to admit a personal inferiority on our part.
I True, the Englishman does not positively assert such individual
, superiority; but what is much more annoying, he calmly assumes
it, and that settles the matter so far as he is concerned.
.'
But in this very quality is to be found the secret of English
colonization. It is the individualist, the self-reliant man, who is

i
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the successful pioneer. He does not need nor desire the eternal
supervision of the government; he is prepared to go out and face
the world alone. The history of all the self-governing colonies
is a history of individual efforts and achievement. The colonies
have worked out their own social problems. They have thrived
most when left to themselves. And what has been true in the
autonomous colonies has been equally true in the less favoured
dependencies of the Crown. The great proconsuls of the British
Empire are the supreme example of triumphant individualism.
It is the character of the individual Englishman, said the late
Count Ito, not the army or navy, that makes the British Empire
what it is. His calm self-possession is the source of his authority.
He is born to the purple; he rules by the force of his own personality. He is assured of his own position; he holds himself responsible to his own conscience. He is sometimes stupid and often
arrogant and self-willed; but he has a high sense of duty, a keen
sense of justice, and an unswerving resolution to carry through
whatever is committed to his care. Into the hands of such men
England has entrusted the governance of her possessions. And
but seldom have they betrayed her trust.
The very individualism of the English people has taught them
to respect the rights of others. Every revolution in English
history has been a compromise. The rights and privileges of the
contending parties have been habitually preserved. The principle of liberty has found expression in the protection of the rights
of minorities. To live and let live has been the political motto of
English statesmen and people. No other nation has been so
insistent upon the maintenance of its own peculiar usages and
institutions, yet none has been so careful to recognize the laws
and customs of foreign people. The policy of the government
has often been cruel, selfish, and hypocritical; and yet there is
but one case in English history where the government has
systematically striven to Anglicize another race, and that is the
case of Ireland. The recent adoption of the Home Rule Bill is
an attempt to make amends for that injustice; it is a return to the
historic principles of national liberalism. It is to the credit of
English imperialism that it has tried to preserve the national
life and institutions of all the subjects of the Empire. Strongly
as the English Government believes in the superiority of its own
civilization, gladly as it would see its institutions adopted throughout the Empire, it has not sought after an artificial uniformity or
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endeavoured to compel its citizens or subjects to accept a supposedly higher and better civilization. The armies of England
have overrun a large part of the world, but they have come
not to destroy but to fulfil. In the province of Quebec to-day
the langnage, religion, and laws of the inhabitants are French;
in South Mrica they are Dutch; in India the Hindus and the
Mohammedans retain their own social and religious institutions;
and so on throughout the Empire. The Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council is called upon to interpret and apply not only
the common law of England but also the tribal usages of the
Maori, Hottentots, Bornians, and many similar races.
It is this combination of the qUalities of personal independence with the recognition of the principles of social and political
liberty which makes the British Empire what it is. It is tbe
secret of England's successful colonial policy. There is no love
lost between the English, Scotch, and Irish; the relationship
between the cockney and the colonial is scarcely that of the
David and Jonathan type; the Hindu and the Anglo-Saxon are
strangers to one another, for the "East is East and the W es t is
West and never the twain shall meet, till earth and sky stand
presently at God's great judgment seat." The relations of
various parts of the Empire are often strained, yet these differences are essentially of the Irish domestic variety in which it is
safer for the outsider not to interfere. The very variety of its
life is the source of its unity; the very diversity of its organization
the secret of its strength. The Empire is powerful because it is
free. Throughout its length and breadth there is a sense of
personal security, a certainty of justice and an assurance of
political freedom that cannot be found elsewhere. The political
faith of the Empire, like that of the Christian church, transcends
all considerations of race, language, religion, nationality, and
civilization. Its loyalty is a devotion to a political ideal, an
ideal of freedom. In short the British Empire is the most liberalminded of all democracies, in that it expresses the highest faith
in humanity itself. The English constitution makes no distinction in respect to race, colour, or previous condition of servitude.
It goes even farther than that of the United States in conferring
full citizenship on all persons within its jurisdiction. There
are no outlanders within the British Empire. The Zulu and
Fiji, unlike the Filipino, are legally qualified to hold any office
under the Crown from the pettiest municipal post up to the
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Premiership of Great Britain. That this right is not a mere
theoretical right is evidenced by the presence of large numbers
of colonists in the imperial service. To the colonial has been
entrusted an ever increasing share in the government of the
Empire.
In short, the superior civilization of the Englishman confers
on him no special privileges; nor does it warrant him, according
to the principles of English liberalism, in forcing his brand of
civilization upon other races within the Empire. It was not
without cause that the old English law laid down the rule that
a man ought not to be judge in his own case. And which among
the nations is placed above this principle of equity; which of
them can forecast the future or rightly determine its own place
or that of any other nation in history? It is, indeed, a dangerous
thing to crush or destroy the soul of a nation. For this reason
alone, if for no other, the policy of imperial expansion can be
justified only in as far as it recognizes and respects the culture of
subject races. It has been the glory of British imperialism that
it has appealed to the national conscionsness of the colonies and
dependencies, that it has encouraged them to seek after a higher
and more independent status, and that in as far as they have
shown political capacity it has conferred upon them the full rights
and privileges of self-government. Thanks to this liberal policy,
the government of the British Empire is gradually being transformed into a great federation of free and autonomous states.
The history and spirit of German nationalism is fundamentally
different. Germany is the cradle of a great civilization. Within
her borders art, music, science, literature, and philosophy have
found their highest expression. These have been her greatest
gifts to humanity. She has accomplished in the higher realm of
thought and feeling what England has in the lower world of
politics-a true mastery of the souls of men. The civilization
of Germany can boast a noble and ancient lineage. But Germany as a nation is a decidedly modern power. She can look
back to a bare half century of national life. At a time when
England and France had long since attained to full national
consciousness and were fighting out their political differences in
India and America, Germany was a backward, semi-feudal
state. True, she had already attained to intellectual pre-eminence,
but her greatest thinkers gave themselves over to the consideration of philosophical rather than political questions. The satire
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of Voltaire was only too true; France ruled the land, England
the sea, ;l.nd Germany the clouds.
The creation of a united Germany was not, as in England, the
resnlt of a long historical struggle on the part of the people; it
was rather the sudden emergence of an ancient civilization under
the genius of a few great statesmen. It was the product of
autocracy, not of democracy; of blood and iron, not of constitutional agitation. Germany had won her way in tbe world by her
own heroic efforts. She was conscious of her own mission in life.
From the very outset she demanded and properly demanded her
rightful place among the world's great powers. But she did
not receive the generous welcome that she had hoped for.
England, in particular, was inclined to look upon the newcomer
as a parvenu, a political upstart in an old established society.
Germany very naturally objected to such cavalier treatment.
She was intensely proud of her new nationality and she soon
made England realize that fact. The long period of German
humiliation was over. German civilization had at last come to
frnition; it had attained a national life of its own. For the future
the development of German culture was identified with the
progress of the German state.
But in this very identification there lurked a danger. The
sacrifice of individual liberty to the demands of high state policy
is ouly a part of the price of German nationalism. What is even
more significant for our purpose is the exaltation of German
civilization at the expense of lesser races and people. In the
mind of the nation at large the maintenance and extension of German culture is inseparably bound up with the ascendency of the
Teutonic race. This conception is, perhaps, best set forth in the
well-known declaration of Treitschke, "that just as the greatness
of Germany is to be found in the government of Germany by
Prussia, so the greatness and good of the world is to be found in
the predominance there of German culture, of the German mindin a word, of the German character." Herein may be seen the
dominant idea of Roman imperialism, the idea of a superior
world-civilization. Germany has succeeded, in theory at least,
through the Holy Roman Empire, to the place and traditions of
ancient Rome. She has inherited the splendid ideals of Roman
culture and organization, of the supreme but beneficent rule of
a superior race. In this imperial conception there is no room for a
competing civilization. Herein is to be found the justification of
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the efforts of the German Government to proscribe the language,
expropriate the land, and suppress the political agitation of the
recalcitrant inhabitants of Posen and Alsace-Ldrraine. It is
a policy of compulsory assimilation. The justification of the
present war rests upon the same sure foundation. By reason of
her situation in the centre of the armed camp of Europe, Germany
is obliged to take the strongest measures for the preservation of
all that is nearest and dearest to her. Her very existence apparently is at stake; and necessity knows no law but the primitive
law of force. Under these circumstances it is little wonder that
the political and intellectual leaders of the country have laid
down the principle that the national aspirations of an alien race,
however justifiable they may be in themselves, must needs give
way to the paramount demands of a higher civilization. From
this standpoint the European war is but one phase of the agelong struggle for the survival of the fittest. In taking up the
Slavic challenge, Germany is fighting not for her own interests
alone but for the civilization of the world. But the very strength
of this conviction bodes ill, in case of a German victory, for the
vanquished party.
The ideals of Germany are not, as many Englishmen would
have us believe, those of material advantage or political ascendency alone. These national aspirations are but another aspect
of German idealism. They are a manifestation of the firm resolution of both rulers and people to live worthily of the high station
whereunto they are called; they are an evidence of the same
nobility of spirit that finds expression in the beauty and strength
of a Wagnerian chorus. For the national ideals which Germany
cherishes in her heart are those of a spiritual dominion. In the
words of the late Professor Cramb:
"Force alone, violence or brute strength by its more silent presence or by
its loud manifestation in war may be necessary to establish this dominion; but
its ends are spiritual. The triumph of the empire will be a triumph of German
culture, of the German world-vision in all the phases and departments of human
life and energy, in religion, poetry, science, art,politics,and social endeavour.
The characteristics of this Gennan world-vision, the benefits which its predominance is likely to confer upon mankind are, a German would allege, truth
instead of falsehood in the deepest and gravest preoccupations of the human
mind."

This supremacy of the German spirit has become almost a religious tenet of the German people. This is, indeed, the soul
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of the Pan-Germanic movement. It has taken possession of the
German heart with all the force of a master passion. These
ideals constitute for them the supreme good not for Germany
alone but for the world at large.
Two conflicting ideals of government are thus brought face
to face. The genius of the British nation has expressed itself in
the form of political liberty ; the genius of the German people in
the form of national culture. And between these two ideals
there is a great gulf fixed, not of race but of tradition. The
conflict is, in truth, a conflict of ideas rather than of nations.
But it is time for me to turn from theoretical considerations to
questions of practical politics. For after all it is the specific
grievance rather than the political principle that sticks in men's
minds and causes trouble. We must face the questions how has
the colonial antagonism of Great Britain and Germany arisen,
and what have been the chief points at issue?
The three successful wars of Prussia against Denmark, Austria,
and France gained for Germany a marked ascendency in European affairs. But Germany was not long satisfied to remain a
continental power only. Political and economic considerations
alike prompted her to aspire to a colonial domain. It had
grieved the hearts of German patriots to see so much of the best
blood of the country drained off to foreign lands, to see rival
nations developing at her expense. It was small satisfaction to
know that German civilization was making its influence felt
throughout the world. The rapid industrial development of the
Fatherland demanded new sources of raw material and new
markets for manufactured products. The success of England's
colonial policy appealed to the imagination of the German people.
Why should Germany not enlarge her dominions and become
a world-wide power? Had she not also an imperial tradition;
and what other nation couId more rightfully claim a place in
the sun? For" in the German race," as Bernharcli has said,
"the instinct for empire is as ancient and as deep-rooted as it is
in the English race; and in the Germany of the present time,
above all, this instinct, by reason of the very strength of Germany within herself, her conscious and vital energy. her sense
of deep and repressed forces, is not a mere cloud of the brain,
but is almost an imperious necessity." In the face of these
demands, Bismarck at last gave way and consented somewhat
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reluctantly to enter upon a policy of colonial expansion. But
the object of such a policy was, he declared, purely commercial, for the protection and promotion of German trade. This
decision marks a new era in the history of Germany. She assumed
her place among the world powers.
The colonial aspirations of Germany, it must be admitted,
were perfectly legitimate. It is doubtful whether any other
state could put forward such strong claims for an extension of
territory. Least of all could Great Britain, with her vast undeveloped areas, properly object to the enterprise of her neighbour. But the practical question at once arose; admitting the
right of expansion, where should Germany expand, what quarter
of the globe should be considered open for occupation and settlement? This was a political rather than a commercial question.
The natural and most suitable region for colonization was to be
found in the temperate zone of South America, where a considerable number of Germans had already established themselves in
thriving communities. But unfortunately for Germany the
Monroe Doctrine blocked the way. According to this wellknown doctrine, the American continent is expressly reserved
for the American people. The European powers are generously
allowed to encroach on one another's territory in all other portions of the world, but they are distinctly informed that their
presence is not desired on this side of the Atlantic no matter how
high and exalted their civilization may be. Germany had no
desire to question the validity of the traditional policy of the
United States and wisely determined to seek other fields for
colonization. Unluckily for England, the districts selected lay
alongside some of the British colonies and in certain cases were
regarded as falling within a British sphere of influence. To the
Monroe Doctrine is thus due in a measure the colonial rivalries
of Germany and Great Britain.
In 1884 the German flag was hoisted over Angra Pequena on
the southwest coast of Africa, in the face of the protest of the
government of Cape Colony. The Australian colonies in turn
were filled with alarm at the rumour of a German expedition to
the neighbouring islands to the north of Torres Strait. The
Queensland Government hastily took possession of a part of the
island of New Guinea but the act of annexation was disavowed by
the Colonial Office. In the hope of forestalling foreign aggression
the Australian colonies united in formulating a Monroe Doctrine
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of their own, in which they solemnly warned all foreign states
to keep away from the Australian coast. At the same time New
Zealand was begging the English Government to annex the
Samoan Islands in order to prevent them from falling into the
hands of a foreign state and being used as a naval base. The
Australasians were qnite willing to reciprocate the courtesy of
the United States by permitting the Germans to settle anywhere
on the American continent provided that the Southern Pacific
were left undisturbed.
But Bismarck paid small heed to British colonial opinion. He
knew the man with whom he had to deal. The British Foreign
Office at this time was occupied by Lord Granville, an aristocratic radical of the Manchester School. Bismarck knew there
was nothing to fear. The colonies were weak and helpless. The
English Government would not show fight; at most it would
content itself with mild representations together with certain
pious observations on the wisdom of respecting the rights of the
natives. Accordingly Germany promptly raised her standard
over several of the principal island groups of the Pacific and
followed this up by the annexation of important areas in Mrica.
By a sudden tour de jorce Germany had become a great colonial
power. In pursuing this policy she had undoubtedly acted well
within her legal rights, but in so doing she had sacrificed the good
will of the British colonies. From the standpoint of international law her conduct was perfectly legitimate, but from the
standpoint of international comity it was of doubtful expediency.
It was, indeed, no small thing to outrage the sensibilities of a
group of ambitious young colonies. A question commercial in its
origin had been converted into a serious political issue. Bismarck
had taught the colonies that their protests were useless, that the
only language which Germany understood was the language of
force.
So far, it seems to me, Germany has a reasonably sound case
against the colonies, notwithstanding their appeal to the principle
of the Monroe Doctrine. In order to justify, however, an aggressive colonial policy, it is not sufficient for a nation to demonstrate its pre-eminent right to enlarge its territory; it must
likewise show an aptitude for colonization in the case of settlement
colonies or a capacity for administration in the case of possessions
with a large native population. But a glance at the statistics
of the German colonies will reveal that after thirty years of
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propaganda the government has succeeded in inducing only
about twenty thousand of its citizens to settle in the colonies.
The host of German emigrants have preferred to seek the protection of any other flag rather than their own. And in respect
of the government of native territories the German Colonial
Office has made even a sorrier showing. From the very outset
the government declined to learn anything from the experience of
English colonization. It believed that its own scientific organization and military efficiency were greatly superior to the rough
and ready methods of English administration. So expensive,
however, has been the bureaucratic regime in the German
colonies that but one of these dependencies up to date has paid
the full cost of administration. This is the penalty for the loss
of political individualism, the price which the country has paid
for the attempt to apply a rigid administrative system to the
divergent conditions of distant territories.
But there has been an even more serious defect in German
colonial policy. The right of expansion carries with it as a
necessary corollary a reciprocal responsibility as to tbe use to
which the right is put. Permit me to use a homely illustration.
As a private individual I have no right to object to any decent
and respectable member of society acquiring a piece of property
alongside my own, however personally objectionable the latter
may be to me; but I can properly object to his using that land
for purposes which are dangerous or deleterious to me. In other
words, the right of acquisition is conditioned upon the property's
being put to a social use. The same principle, it seems to me,
shonld be equally applicable to the relations of states. The
right of conquest or territorial sovereignty is not, as is sometimes
assumed, an absolute and unqualified right; it is subject not
only to "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind" but also
to the moral obligation of respecting as far as possible the social
and political institutions of friendly neighbouring states. Upon
the recognition of this principle depends in fact the social progress
of mankind.
I can still remember distinctly my surprise when on appearing at my first lecture on Colonial Government at the
University of Berlin, I saw a splendid group of young military
officers in full uniform occupying all the front rows of the room,
the mere civilian members of the class being seated very modestly
some distance in the rear. In this little incident I saw clearly
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revealed two of the most characteristic features of German
society-the marked pre-eminence of the military class and the
superior scientific training of all officers of state. At the same
time there was brought home to me the equally significant fact
that the Prossian military system was being introduced in full
force throughout the German colonies. The administration of
the German possessions was to be placed in the hands, not of
civil officials, as is the case in the British and American colonies,
but of military men whose ideas of government were almost
necessarily those of the barracks and mess room. The divergent
character of the political systems of the three great colonial
powers now at war has been happily summed up in the statement
that whenever England establishes a colony she sets up a customs
house, Germany bnilds a fort, and France a road. The German
colonies were doomed from the outset to an essentially autocratic
r~me.
From their very location within the tropics they were
not suitable for settlement purposes; they could never become
the actual or prospective home of thousands of the loyal sons and
daughters of the Fatherland. They were, on the contrary,
commercial prospects or military outposts for the protection of
German interests in different parts of the world. That Germany
was legally entitled to set up a military administration in her
colonies cannot be questioned. It is inherent in the very nature
of sovereignty that a state shall be free to choose its own form of
government. But the question now at issue is not one of legality
alone. The attempt of the English parliament to tax the American colonies has been rightly considered as one of the greatest
crimes of history Yet from the constitutional standpoint the
action of the English Government was perfectly valid. It is
only when we consider the question from the higher standpoint
of human liberty that the revolt of the American colonies is
entirely justified. There is a higher court of appeal than to the
throne of Cresar or to the decisions of a supreme court. The
judgments of history are not juristic in character; they are based
upon the eternal principles of justice and liberty. And it is to
this higher test that Germany must submit her colonial policy.
But the problem was even more serious in its international
bearings. The policy of the German Colonial Office reacted
powerfully on the British colonies. For many years the latter
had been living in a state of happy isolation. They had been
busy working out their own social and economic problems with
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but a passing thought to the political complications of Europe.
Now for the first time they found themselves face to face with a
military danger. They had no direct interest in foreign politics
and had no desire, as Sir Wilfrid Laurier said, "to be caught in
the maelstrom of European militarism." But through no fault
vf their own the menace was brought to their very shores. Instead of holding out to them the right hand of fellowship, Germany had greeted them with the mailed fist. She had not only
forced herself upon them as al< •.mwelcome neighbour, but had
also proceeded to set up a military establishment incompatible
with their political and social ideals. In the judgment of the
colonies Germany had abused the rights of territorial sovereignty
by endangering the peace of her neighbours. To them the
dominion of Germany appeared in the light of a revival of the
principles of Roman imperialism.
The lesson was not lost on the British colonies. Probably no
other factor has contributed so much to develop the spirit of
colonial nationalism particularly in the Australasian colonies.
From this time dates the movement for the organization of a
distinct army and navy for the self-governing colonies. The
latter were no longer content to rely upon the protection of the
mother land, but proceeded to develop their own means of selfdefence. Germany sowed the wind; she has reaped the whirlwind in the loss of many of her colonies and in the dispatch of
150,000 colonial troops to the battlefields of Europe. This is the
colonial answer to General Bernhardi's declaration that the
"colonies could be completely ignored so far as concerns any
European theatre of war.
We must now turn to the fiscal aspect of the question. The
adoption by England of the free-trade principles of the Manchester School had a most important effect upon the commercial
relations of the colonies with the mother land. The colonial legislatures were now entrusted with the power of determining their
own tariff policies according to their respective needs. But they
were not entirely free to do as they wished. The government
at Westminister no longer attempted to interfere with the fiscal
schedules of the colonies, but it did indirectly place an important
restriction upon their economic freedom through the exercise of
the treaty-making power and the royal veto. There was still
an imperial commercial policy; only its name and practice had
been changed from protection to free trade. In furtherance of
tJ
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this policy Great Britain had entered into commercial treaties
with Belgium and the North German Bund under the terms of
which the colonies were prohibited from levying discriminatory
duties. On the advent of the Liberal party to power in Canada,
Sir Wilfrid Laurier called upon the English Government to
tenmnate these treaties with a view to the adoption of a policy
of imperial preferential trade. The British Government acceded
to the demand and formal notice of the tenmnation of the agreement was soon after conveyed to Germany. Sir Wilfrid Laurier
at once proceeded to put his policy into effect by granting a 25
per cent. preference to Great Britain and most of the British
colonies. This preferential policy opened up a new era in imperial
politics. It was intended to give notice to the world at large of
the growing sense of imperial unity. This policy was accepted
by all the powers save one as a natural and legitimate expression
of colonial loyalty. That one exception was Germany. She
alone refused to treat the British Empire as a commercial unit
and demanded that she should be put upon a fiscal equality with
the mother land in the Canadian market upon pain of levying
retaliatory duties. Sir Wilfrid Laurier refused to back down,
whereupon the German Government promptly imposed countervailing duties and Canada retaliated in turn. A sharp tariff
war ensued. England declined to interfere but the other se1£governing colonies took up the challenge and ranged themselves
by the side of the Dominion. Germany got the worst of the
petty fiscal squabble and at last agreed to withdraw her discriminating duties and accept the policy of imperial preferential trade.
In taking such drastic measures Germany had acted well
within her rights. She was entitled to treat the British se1£governing colonies as fiscally independent, for such in fact they
were; but it was none the less inexpedient for her to do so in
view of the intensity of colonial feeling in the matter.
On a
previous occasion she had appeared to challenge the principle of
colonial nationalism; she now appeared to attack the ideal of
imperial unity. The colonies could not overlook the fact that
the British colonies alone had been singled out for attack whereas
the preferential policies of other nations including France and the
United States had been accepted by the German Government
without question, and apparently without thought of retaliation.
Throughout all these early controversies Great Britain had
remained a passive spectator. She had left the colonies to fight
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their own battles. So far as she had ventured to interfere it was
rather with a view to modify than to support the pretensions of
the colonies. The present anti-German feeling throughout the
British Empire did not arise in England but in the colonies. The
imperialistic spirit had gained the ascendency in the latter long
before it succeeded in making much of an impression upon
English politics. The colonial policy of England was still conducted according to the tenets of the Manchester School. At the
same time her foreign policy was marked by a careful withdrawal
from active participation in European politics. There was little
occasion for international complications. As late as 1899 Lord
Salisbury declared that the relations of Germany and Great
Britain were" everything we could desire." But colonial suspicions of Germany's imperial designs had already spread to England, and with the growth of colonial influence in English politics
that suspicion became more strongly confirmed. The Kruger
telegram and acrid German criticisms of the Boer war added fuel
to the flames. Many of the leaders of English public opinion
came to believe that Germany harboured designs on the British
Empire, and the Foreign Office began to assume a more critical
attitude towards Wilhelmstrasse.
But the political controversy was destined to take on a more
materialistic character. The economic rivalry of the two countries added to the flame of international suspicion and misunderstanding. A part of the commercial interests of the two
countries were quick to play upon national sentiment to further
their own selfish interests. It was no mere accident that the
tariff-reform agitation and anti-German sentiment developed
side by side in England. They were, in truth, but different
phases of the same movement. Protection, according to its
wont, robed itself in the false garb of patriotism and set forth to
sow discord between the two peoples. The big armament firms
in turn played and preyed upon the fears of the pUblic. The
history of this agitation reflects no little discredit upon a considerable portion of the Conservative press and party. The peace propaganda of the Liberal leaders checked for a time this campaign
of malevolence, but the refusal of the German Government to
agree to any of their proposals for a limitation of armaments
defeated their well-intentioned efforts to bring about a happy
solution of the points of issue. In both countries the seed of
national hostility had been well scattered. The asperities of the
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press, the agitations of the Navy Leagues, the programmes of the
Admiralty and War Departments were the immediate result of
this insidious campaigu. And Europe is now reaping the full
harvest.
For the beginning of this international antagonism Great
Britain cannot be held primarily responsible. She did not
afford the occasion for the first offence. The aggressive policy of
Germany, as we have seen, stirred up a hostile spirit in the
colonies and this reacted strongly on English public opinion.
The foreign policy of England had in truth become a colonial
policy. It was in reality, as Lord Rosebery declared, "more
dictated from the extremities of the Empire than from London
itself." But for the subsequent development of England's
foreign policy, for the entangling European alliance, for the
policy of the political isolation of Germany, for the Moroccan
imbroglio, the British Government must bear its full share of
responsibility. For many years Great Britain had been content
to be an imperial power; she had consciously withdrawn from
continental politics. She did not object to the ascendellcy of
Germany on land, provided that she ruled the seas. But with
the advent of Germany as a colonial power England resumed her
former place in the councils of Europe; Germany had apparently
challenged her position as an imperial power. England replied
by questioning her rival's supremacy in Europe. Not that
England essayed to be a great European power, but that she
endeavoured to adjust or readjust the balance of European
power so as to secure a free hand for carrying out her imperial
policy. The policies of both nations were avowedly patriotic
but at the same time essentially selfish. A spirit of exaggerated
nationalism has dictated the policies of the chancelleries of
Europe. And this, after all, as far as the chief European
states are concerned, is the deep underlying cause of the present
war.

The British colonies have not gone into the war blindly or
from compulsion but of their own free will. They were kept
well informed as to the course of negotiations and they heartily
approved of the policy of Sir Edward Grey. The war is of their
own malcing as far as their participation is concerned. The
English Government has not the right to levy a single man or
impose a single penny of taxation in any of the self-governing
colonies for the support of the war. The Canadian, Australian,
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and Indian troops can be employed outside their respective
dominions only at the instance of these governments themselves.
In fact, in both fiscal and military matters the self-governing
colonies enjoy what is practically an independent status. And
even in respect to foreign affairs they have developed in some
cases a distinct policy of their own, as for example in respect to
relations with Japan. They carryon their negotiations through
their own officials and determine for themselves what imperial
treaties shall be made operative within their territories. According to the conventions of the constitution neither the imperial
government nor parliament can bind them without their own
consent. "Daughter am I in my mother's house, but mistress in
myown.'1
In joining in the war, the colonies have no desire to wreck
the German Empire, to impair its civilization or subject it to an
alien race. They seek but the removal of the dark threatening
cloud of militarism which has hung over them since 1884. The
war to them is a defensive war, a war for the preservation not of
the British Empire alone but of the constitutional principles of
national liberty on which that empire is based. It is a struggle
not of rival races or of competing civilizations, but of contrasted
forms of government, of political ideals, of democracy versus
autocracy. And in that issue they feel that they have as great
an interest as England herself. They are convinced of the
justice of their cause. Out of this war they hope to see a better
and more liberal-minded empire arise.
"Nobody doubts," said a prominent Hindu, U whatever may be the temporary difficulties we shall emerge victorious out of this terrible war~ and
we Indians feel that it will open a new chapter in our history, and if I may say
so, in the history of England, brighter and nobler than any in the past, for now
and henceforth, England, India, and the oversea dominions will, stand and
grow together in bonds sanctified on the field of battle."

But more than that, they hope to see, in the words of Gladstone,
.. the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing
idea of European politics." In place of the rule of force the
colonies would set up the ideals of the gospel of universal peace,
a peace not dependent upon the supremacy of the single state
or on the uncertain balancing of selfish interests, but broadbased upon the public opinion of the whole community of
nations.
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In this spirit of liberalism the colonies appeal with the same
high confidence as does Gennany, to the judgment of history.
Their prayer is the prayer of Ajax in the Battle of the Ships:
". And now deliver thou, 0 Father Zeus, the sons of the Achaians from
under this cloud and make clear sky above them and grant to their eyes to see;
that so if it be thy will to slay tbem, thou slay them in the light.· Thus spoke
he and Father Zeus looked down upon him in his sore travail. And forthwith
he smote the mist and drove away the murk from Heaven and the whole face
of the battle was made plain."
c. D. ALLIN.
U Diversity of Minnesota.

